

Man as Dualizing Being. The Remote Anthropological Foundations of Economic Activity (Part I: Introduction and first steps)

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ABSTRACT: Economics is grounded on unexamined anthropological assumptions. The present investigation seeks to uncover the *remote* anthropological foundations of *economic activity* (*the theme* of Economics). This first part (I) examines the current situation of related research; it then suggests man's condition as a "dualizing being" as the ultimate grounding for Economics –after previously clarifying the notion of *dualization*–; finally, it presents the most radical dualizations. The (forthcoming) second part (II) will investigate operative dualizations –derived from the former–, and will conclude that economic activity begins delineating itself by means of the essential dualization of man and has, as its least remote foundation, his historical situation.

KEYWORDS: Transcendental anthropology, Leonardo Polo, dualizing being, productive action, economic activity, Economics

1. INTRODUCTION*

The aim of this paper is to offer a basic philosophical scheme about man that may serve as a reference frame for an appropriate anthropological study of economic activity. As it is a philosophical investigation, it is focused on the ultimate issues of anthropology, without admitting beforehand that anything should be excluded from proper examination. (*cf.* Falgueras Salinas 2010, 14-15) On the other hand, as the subheading of the paper shows, we do not intend to cover the whole field of philosophical anthropology, but rather only that which is circumscribed to the necessary matter regarding the study of a very particular aspect of human beings: their economic activity. Through the conjoining of its (philosophical) approach with the (economic) theme at which this investigation is ultimately oriented, we derive the substantive issues that guide us, namely, why must we engage in economic activity? And what is the human sense of economic activity? Or the equivalent, what is the foundation and destination¹ of economic activity? We should keep in mind that the answer to these questions, insofar as they relate to remote and ultimate affairs, must be gradual, and should therefore unfold in various studies.² In the present article we will attend only to the foundations and first sense of economic activity, which means that, as we regard only the beginning of this issue, we will remain quite away from the strictly economic contents; at this moment we will only mark the remote anthropological domain in which economics unfold.

To this end, we take inspiration in the philosophical insights provided to anthropology by Leonardo Polo: both because of their solidi-

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¹ We should markedly distinguish between “foundation” and “destination” (*cf.* Falgueras Salinas 1998, 57-65). A foundation is metaphysical, while destination, understood as an anthropological ultimacy, implies freedom. Man is affected by both, but in different ways: while he does not lack foundation, insofar as he is linked to the being of the universe and his body, still the foundation is not the hegemonic ultimacy –this corresponds only to destination, as we shall see throughout this investigation.

² Within our research project as a whole, this paper is the first step after the already published (Falgueras Salinas and Falgueras Sorrauren 2015). The ideas presented in this paper lay the foundations of future investigations.

ty and their depth; indeed, he has not only developed a harmonic and organic sum of classic philosophical anthropology, he has also elevated it to a transcendental height without precedent, placing it right next to metaphysics, but independent from it. In this sense, his insights have crowned and corrected the aspirations of modern philosophical anthropology.³

Ours is both a difficult and unusual investigation for various motives. Firstly, because the topic at hand has, in general, received very little attention by philosophers⁴ and by economists, especially considering the attention normally given to other topics that concern both sciences. Secondly, Polo's philosophy –difficult in itself because of its depth, its renewal scope and the small attention it still warrants from academic circles– can only provide us with basic, cardinal guidelines for our research, as it has scarcely been applied to the problems at hand.⁵ Thirdly, because the majority of the (few) philosophers that study these matters do not usually take their investigations all the way to the foundations of the economic activity so far as we intend here.⁶

³ Cf. Polo 1999 and 2003.

⁴ Apart from those quoted below, some Spanish-speaking philosophers and economists have touched upon the subject of the anthropological foundations of economic activity, e.g.: Millán Puelles (1974), Bunge (1982), Alvira (1988), Barceló (1992), Rubio de Urquía (1996), Crespo (2012), Melendo (2013). Even though the authors that deal with the relation between economics and ethics touch upon subjects related to the ones considered in this paper, we will only attend here to those that explicitly go back to the first foundations of human activity.

⁵ Besides establishing the transcendental bases of anthropology that will serve as our guide, Polo has published several works on economics –collected in Polo 2012–, and has left several remarks throughout his works about the sense of economic activity. We will keep these in mind for further investigations; still, we must acknowledge that Polo has not published a detailed grounding of economic theory. Outside Polo's work, only Sellés (2006), whose essential theses we share, aims, following Polo's philosophy, to tackle the same task we do, albeit with a different focus: his paper is meant for entrepreneurs, presupposes the notion of economy, and presents his arguments in an analytical-lineal way. Our approach, on the other hand, is technical, for philosophers, and is headed towards enlightening the anthropological origin of economic dualizations without assuming them. Our investigation does not yield the result that man is, properly speaking, an “economic *being*” (Sellés 2006, 174 y 195), but rather that economic activity belongs only to the *human essence, in its current state*.

⁶ Millán Puelles begins by studying basic human necessities –those that set us apart

All these circumstances make it harder to frame this paper within the list of issues that are normally dealt with in philosophy and economics. Undoubtedly, this represents an initial disadvantage to appraise, in its just measure, the real importance of our approach for the understanding of economics. In order to face these pitfalls from the very beginning, this introduction will dedicate itself (a), in the first place, to lay down the subject of our investigation in light of current research, and (b), in the second place, it will highlight its intrinsic relevance to economics.⁷ After this, some ending remarks will close this introduction.

a) The study of the anthropological foundations of economics in contemporary research

We will start by examining our subject in the light of current research. The first thing that becomes apparent is that the complete

from animals–, and freedom as an attribute. Thus, he does not go as far back as the being and essence of man, as we pretend here. Bunge directs his attention to economic science, and while he recommends investigating his ontological, noetic and ethical assumptions, he does not directly deal with them. Alvira establishes an index of economic categories, whose first member is appropriation, assuming the ideas of freedom and necessities. Barceló follows Bunge's lead. Rubio de Urquía focuses the grounding of economics on the assignative process, but this is the immediate –not the ultimate– origin of human economic activity. Crespo goes deeper, namely, into the ontological limitation of man: according to him, this limitation derives from the body and is expressed in the satisfaction of necessities; still, he barely stops to consider it. Finally, while Melendo points out to one the radicals of economics –the human person– as a solution to the actual crisis, he does not try to go back as far as the foundations of economic activity; instead, he focuses his investigation on the essence of money. These studies are all correct in their basic thesis, so we will refer to them when appropriate in future investigations, as the present one attempts only to go farther into the task of establishing the fundament and destination of economic activity.

⁷ We should here call to mind the use we make of upper and lower case letters: we normally use lower case for the names of all sciences and disciplines, except when the designation is the same for a science and for what it studies. In the case of economic science, we use upper case to distinguish the science (Economics) from economic activity. We would do the same if we referred to *personal rights* [*derechos*] and *Law* [*Derecho*] as a science that studies the principles and norms of human relations in a society; or for *history* as a succession of facts and *History* as a scientific discipline.

project this paper deals with is firmly set between philosophy and economics, so that it could be aptly placed in a field that may be called *philosophy of economics*, if by such a discipline it were understood –as we do– the search for the foundations and the philosophical sense of economic activity and science. However, as Mäki (2001, xv) has made clear, the rising importance of economics within contemporary science is manifest in the way the discipline is used, on the one hand, as a method to study social phenomena; and in the other hand, when considered an object of study of itself. While the aim of studying social phenomena with economic methods has been developed by the science of economics itself (or economic theory), it has fallen to the philosophy of economics to study this science *qua* science. This may help us understand why the philosophy of economics has been relegated to the role of a mere logic-methodological consideration of economic science,⁸ which explains why we cannot fully include our research in it. We rather seek to establish and study the proper theme of economics, and we will consider its method only insofar as it is subjected to its subject-matter.

This implicit equivalency between the philosophy of economic science and its methodology may explain the recent apparition within

⁸ An example of this reduction can be found in the two articles that Hutchinson (1996 and 1997), one of the leading 20th century figures in the area, dedicates to sum up the historical evolution and current state of Economics: from the very introduction of the first article he associates the “methodology” with the “philosophy” of Economics. In this line we can include, among others, the investigations of Blaug (1990) and Hausman (1992). To this respect, Düppe (2011) suggests that the equivalence between economic philosophy and methodology is a consequence of the professionalization process that the latter has experienced in the second half of last century. Even if economic methodology came to be with the aim of bringing the theory closer to reality (*cf.* Düppe 2011, 169-171), its professionalization, paradoxically, had the opposite effect, as it made it more sophisticated from a logical-philosophical viewpoint, which has in turn generated more theory bereft of content (Düppe 2011, 173-175). In a similar vein, Colander (2013) holds that modern economic methodology has forgotten its initial role of studying the economic method with the object of improving its practical application; on the contrary, it has exclusively focused on debating (methodological-)theoretical problems that are of interest only to specialists. In other words: economic methodology has made the study of the method of economic theory a subject that is exclusive to its investigations, and has forgotten to consider the themes of economic science.

the field of a new sort of sub-area of research that is experiencing growing attention: the “ontology of economics”, as Mäki calls it (*cf.* 2001, 3).⁹ Given the author’s description –the study of the “realm of economic science”–, (Mäki 2001, 4) as well as the fact that some of the proper themes of the “ontology of economics” are directly related to those we deal with more amply here,¹⁰ it could be said that this new (sub)area of knowledge might be the natural habitat for our research. However, the difference between them resides in the fact that investigations into the “ontology of economics” focus their study, primarily, on the (human) conceptions of the reality that lies underneath current socio-economic theories, and not on the proper foundations of economic activity.¹¹ On the contrary, we focus our attention directly on real economy, which we suggest ascribing to the domain of a transcendental anthropology. This domain is different from that of metaphysics,¹² to which, one way or another, studies about the “ontology of economics” are commonly attributed.¹³

⁹ The papers included in this book are examples of the above-mentioned research line. While we still have to see the future reach of the name “ontology” for the kind of research suggested by Mäki, his book seems to indicate that it deals with the assumptions taken by economists to develop their theories and scientific models. On his behalf, Lawson (1997 and 2003) aims to reorient economic theory going back to a *social* ontology as a referent. In a different, more metaphysical sense, Crespo (2006) also speaks of an ontology of economics.

¹⁰ For example, its preoccupation with allowing a better understanding of economic notions such as scarcity, wealth, market, money, exchange, etc. (Mäki 2001, 3-4).

¹¹ This is due to the fact, as Mäki explains (2001, 4-6), that economists build their theories through a series of implicit assumptions that are not subjected to debate; in this sense, they are absolute and they constitute the basic elements from which all other suppositions and deductions are explained. As a consequence, these unexamined assumptions determine both the method of investigations and the demarcation of what is considered in the “economic realm”, and are pre-established apart from real economic activity.

¹² Polo has suggested separating anthropology and making it independent from metaphysics. Both anthropology and metaphysics end up being first knowledge, each one in its own order. In this sense, when we employ term “ontology” in this paper, we will not mean metaphysics, but rather the study of man’s transcendental being and essence.

¹³ *Cf.* Mäki (2001, 8), and Lawson (2003, xv). Crespo (2006, 767-768), while sharing the term “ontology” with these authors, employs it as a synonym for classic

As it is impossible to fit our research into the contemporary philosophy of economics, and precisely because it aims to bring to light the foundations and the *anthropological* sense of economic activity, we might assume this paper fits the intersection between the fields of anthropology and economics. But even if in its beginnings economic anthropology had the intention of establishing a dialogue with economics, one that even clarified the *universal principles of economic activity*,¹⁴ today this kind of studies involves either research made by anthropologists regarding borrowed economic notions assumed under their own methods, or studies made by economists regarding anthropological concepts –e.g. the notions of culture and identity– with methods proper to modern economics. Thus the grounding role formerly intended for economic anthropology has been lost over time; what remains are common themes studied separately by anthropologists and economists, each following their own methods.¹⁵

metaphysics. However, his engaging article about the way in which Aristotle understood economics –as a human action (cf. 771-776)–, reinforces the thesis that anthropology is the most appropriate discipline to correctly study economic activity. The fact that Mäki considers the ontology of economic as (principally) ascribable to metaphysics may be due, among other reasons, to the fact that he hasn't realized that the implicit assumptions over which economists build their theories (cf. note 11 above) are not actually metaphysical but anthropological. These assumptions would actually constitute, as pointed out by Rubio de Urquía, the true unexamined point of departure Mäki talks about. According to Rubio de Urquía, all modern economic theories employ models whose center is a system of statements that define (ideal) kinds of people that develop their activity in general (or ideal) kinds of environments (2009, 526). Therefore, and independently from what its authors affirm, such theories always contain an anthropology that serves as their fundament (Rubio de Urquía, 2003, 33). Furthermore, as Rubio de Urquía also explains (2003, 46-47), given that what characterizes modern theoretic-economic praxis is that the task of building models is not centered on the specification of “ideal worlds” upon which they are built, so much as deducing their laws and properties, we may understand that the above-mentioned anthropological assumptions remain implicit, just as Mäki suggests.

¹⁴ In order to have an idea of the historical evolution of this discipline, the reader is invited to consult: Lodewijks (1994, 86); Pearson (2000, 936); Gregory (2000, 1005ff); Ferguson (2000, 994); Hart (2000, 1022); Mirowski (2000, 928).

¹⁵ As pointed out by Mirowski (2000, 930), at most such investigations yielded were parallel discoveries that could not establish a true dialogue among them. This fragmentation of economic anthropology can be confirmed in the definitions and

Insofar as our research intends to go back to the grounding of economic activity, it does not fully coincide neither with the aims nor the methods of current economic anthropology. Our objectives, on the other hand, coincide with the ones originally held by that discipline – and this will allow us to take advantage of them when we find it convenient–; still, our methods radically differ from them both in delimiting our study field and in its procedures, as we do not focus on data gathering or employ the methods of cultural or ethnographic anthropology.

b) *The relevance of an anthropological grounding of Economics*

In view of the fact that it does not fit in the usual fields of contemporary scientific research, the peculiarity of our investigation can readily be grasped. At this juncture, we could hastily conclude that the almost null attention these topics receive today by the sciences that should logically deal with them is an indication of their irrelevance. Such an appreciation, however, is incorrect for many reasons.

In the first place, this appreciation is incorrect because the lack of interest for a particular theme shown by the scientific community *at a specific point in time* cannot be interpreted as a sign of overall irrelevance; this is especially true in economic science, which, as some authors have pointed out, stands out due to the existence of *trends* towards which it dedicates its attention.¹⁶ Trends are ephemeral,¹⁷

descriptions that appear in Gregory (1987, 22-28), or in Marroquín Gramajo (2010, 23-34).

¹⁶ Cf. Krepes (1997, 72-73), who acknowledges the existence of trends in the subjects studied by economists, and also points out some of its negative consequences (1997, 84 n9). Along the same lines, Mayer (1993, 157) admits that there is a tendency between economists to consider important any topic about which several of the most prestigious journals have published repeatedly in a relatively short (and recent) period of time, just because this generates the sensation that such a topic is at the fore of economic research. This results in a proliferation (trend) of articles about the same subject, that await publication in journals of lesser prestige. Finally, Thurow (1977, 80ff) calls attention to the predisposition of economists to study problems that preoccupy society at a specific point in time as another trend-building factor, as these are obviously matters that constantly change. Mayer (1993, 18), for his part, affirms that this predisposition to focus in current social problems has its root in economists wanting to win public appreciation and status.

and when science subjects itself to them, they become biased (if not entirely subjective) opinions about reality; this is incompatible with scientific knowledge's rigor and claim for objectivity, and of course also with philosophical knowledge. We shouldn't therefore confuse the passing interest a particular subject raises because of contingent reasons with the systematic importance it holds for the comprehension of its respective science. In fact, the lack of interest that current economists show for our subject –the foundations and anthropological sense of economic activity– should not lead us to believe that this has been the case in the whole history of economic thought. It is rather to the contrary, since from the very beginning of economic studies, economists have shown a clear interest in clarifying their own field of study, which, ultimately, has always been related to anthropology.¹⁸ Indeed, the first task of any rigorous discipline must necessarily consist of clearly establishing the domain of reality to which its attention will be directed, strictly pointing out what stays outside and what falls within its area of knowledge. This is so important to science that possibly the greatest ignorance a scientist can be accused of is the *ignorantia elenchi*.¹⁹ That is why the first authors of economic science troubled themselves with the demarcation of their area of knowledge: given that the area that contains economics is anthropol-

¹⁷ Cf. Pascal (*Pensées*, 61-309, 508); “*Tout ce qui se perfectionne par progrès périt aussi par progrès*” (*Pensées*, Série XXVII, 779-88, 599).

¹⁸ As explained by Kirzner (1976, 2ff), economists have debated for over two centuries about the subject matter of economic science, having suggested different subjects as proper themes: richness, subsistence, scarcity, maximization, etc. For our purposes, the most relevant part of Kirzner's study is his finding that economists have always set off from a previous delimitation of the field of reality that Economics considers, and that all suggested subjects are included in anthropology, insofar as they fall within human economic activity.

¹⁹ “A fallacy that consists in discussing that which is out of the question” [Sofisma que consiste en discutir lo que está fuera de la cuestión] (Lalande 1966, 478). In the end, it consists in not knowing what is being discussed or examined. Naturally, even if the subject matter of any discipline is the first issue to be determined, it cannot be just indicated: the method to treat properly also has to be established. But in the union of method and theme, whose result is a specific knowledge, the method is the one that should accommodate to the theme, and not the other way around. (Cf. Falgueras Salinas and Falgueras Sorauren 2015, 22ff).

ogy, they studied, at least indirectly, the anthropological foundations of their science.

In the second place, this appreciation is incorrect, as it is symptomatic of a deeper problem, namely, that most of today's economists limit their attention exclusively to the economic method, completely forgetting or neglecting the proper subject of their own science. Such neglect is partly due to the way in which modern economic theory is constructed,²⁰ with its tendency to hide away the necessity of an anthropological grounding, even if it does not actually make economics independent from it, as indicated by Rubio de Urquía.²¹ As a confirmation of this thesis, we must recognize that even if contemporary economists show a lack of interest in their subject, an important number of them elevates economic theory to the point of making it serve as the foundation of social sciences, among which they include anthropology, thus inverting the relation between anthropology and economics –which still remains a relation of grounding–. This is the case of many authors of the so-called *economics imperialism*, by which some extend the economic method even as far as biology.²² We may thus see that even when the search for the foundations of economics is neglected, the task of finding those of other social sciences is still continued and, indeed, is very positively valued.²³ The same authors that give Economics credit for grounding other sciences do not take into account that economic science itself needs grounding. The question is, then, why should we not look for the foundations of Economics? Grounding the economic science means establishing the

²⁰ As indicated by Rubio de Urquía (2003, 19), contemporary economic science has configured itself without a clear and firm grounding.

²¹ Cf. note 13 above.

²² One of the most well-known advocates of this view is J. Hirshleifer (1985). But even those that study the economy of animals set out from an (incorrect) *interpretation* of human being, namely, that man is just one more animal, or even just a 'way' for gene survival.

²³ Indeed, the staunchest defenders of economics imperialism suggest that economic theory –which they consider independent from any anthropology–, is a way of understanding human behavior: an *ersatz* anthropology that grounds all other social sciences. Even those who deny economic theory depends upon anthropology must, ultimately, hold that Economics itself, as they conceive it, is a way of understanding human behavior, i.e. of grounding anthropology.

relation its contents holds with extramental reality, which in this case clearly refers to human economic activity.

Furthermore, the truth of the proposition: ‘all economic investigation is grounded on an anthropology’, comes forth not just when studying specific models of modern economic theory –the method followed by Rubio de Urquía–, but even more so when we attend to very simple philosophical reasons, such as the following. First, *only man can make science*, so that scientists that equate human to animal actions should be able to provide examples of animals that hold scientific assertions and build scientific systems, something impossible without rationality. In second place, the practical activity studied by economics is, of course, a *rational* human action, not merely a tendency and certainly not an instinct. Animals do not need to know in order to act, but economics aims to be a rationally *directive* knowledge about actions.²⁴ Moreover, if anybody tried to reduce economics to a merely descriptive kind of knowledge, he would have to realize that the (apparent) “fun in describing” is only possible and satisfactory for rational beings. In third and last place, if the desire for knowledge is natural for all men, knowledge which openly declares the assumptions upon which it is based –in this case, philosophical anthropology– will always be better and more congruous than knowledge that ignores them or pretends not to have them.²⁵ Consequently, if economics wants to be a true science, it has to recognize itself as made by man with the intent of providing reasons for his actions.

Therefore, the fact that in our day virtually no economist faces the necessity of declaring and justifying his anthropological point of departure does not mean –whether he acknowledges or even realizes it or not– that he is not (surreptitiously) standing on one, operating behind his theoretical constructions and its practical applications. We assume, then, that a common feature to all economic theories is to suppose anthropology as its starting point, and that it is necessary for its congruency to declare it. For our part, due to the previous philo-

²⁴ For example, L. Robbins (1962, 152ff) holds that the relevance of economic science does not depend on its capacity to release us from the obligation of choosing, but in that it *helps* us make better choices, i.e. in that it gives us a greater knowledge of the implications of different practical elections.

²⁵ And thus it is a form of knowledge that lacks direction.

sophical reasons, we estimate it as a necessary task to understand economic activity and the science that studies it, to begin by radically establishing its foundations and sense.

c) Some final remarks

We will study, then, the sources of human economic activity, but in such a way that our philosophical method remains respectful to economics' own nature. In other words, we will try to go further and provide, within the boundaries of anthropology, the foundation and sense of economic science, so as to delineate its subject matter from a wider perspective, namely, the more radical domain of human affairs in which economics dwells and in which it properly develops.²⁶ It is only thus that the remote bases and the rational sense of economic activity will unveil themselves.

We must consequently declare that our approach, strictly speaking, surpasses economic science, both in its theme and in its method, insofar as it focuses on the *ultimate* foundations and *raison d'être* of human economic activity. We do not deny nor underestimate economics' subject or method; but instead of directly focusing on the solutions of practical economic problems, we direct our attention to the dependency of its themes and methodologies on anthropological radicals.²⁷

More specifically, in what follows we will concentrate on showing how economic activity finds its ultimate sense in the essence of man and its historical situation. We will not yet establish the starting point of economic activity; for the moment, we will concentrate on the foundations and radical sense of human activity. To this end we will first clarify the meaning of the notion of *dualization* (§2)²⁸; then, after

²⁶ Molecular biology, for example, is a discipline that has its own boundaries, and yet undoubtedly falls within the wider domain of biology in general. It is the same case with economic science: as economic activity –the theme of Economics– is included within the domain of human affairs, it must necessarily be subjected, then, to philosophical anthropology.

²⁷ Polo shows the necessity of elevating the frame of reference unto the anthropological radicals, in a historical fashion (*cf.* 2012, 269ff).

²⁸ This notion is almost transcendental in Polo's anthropology (1999, 165). However,

deducing the most radical dualizations (§3), we will present an orderly account of their essential anthropological manifestations (§4), to conclude by explaining the productive dualization (§5), whose wide domain includes the dualizations of economic activity (which will be developed in later studies).

2. MAN AS A DUALIZING BEING: THE NOTION OF DUALIZATION

Polo understands the dual dimension of the human being through his discovery of the “additionally” [además] man’s character, which corresponds to the human personal being²⁹. According to Polo, “additionally” does not just mean an adverb, but pure adverbiality. Man is ad-verbial: his being is a *co-being*, i.e. it exists accompanying being (verb). (Cf. 1999, 118, text and note; also 164-165) Still, it cannot be said that man is “additionally” to God, because no creature can add anything to God; rather, a human being only co-exists with another creature: the universe’s being, which it surpasses. In this way, being a human person means being a person that co-exists, a person that exists by dualizing him- or herself.³⁰

he speaks of “dualities”, not “dualizations”, which is a variant we introduce here to strengthen their non-passive but rather active character of what he calls *human dualities*. In this sense, we only employ the term “duality” when we refer to the quality of something, be it human or not, that consists of two elements; and “dualization” when we refer to the human dualizing activity. With this, however, we do not intend to correct but to continue exploring the Polian notion, for he has not explicitly developed his discovery in all its cases: in the majority he has merely indicated the appropriate duality, as mentioned by Piá (2001, 34).

²⁹ *Translator’s note*. “Además” is one of the hardest terms in Polo’s philosophy to translate. Polian scholars have suggested different possible translations (including, but not limited to: “furthermore”, “being-more”, “additionally”, “moreover”, “besides”), none of which makes full justice to the original. It is important to note here that Polo uses it to characterize the human personal being in a philosophical-anthropological frame: it is not a “note” or a separable “feature” or an “essential attribute” of any kind of man’s being. It is rather the *esse proprie* of man’s personal being.

³⁰ According to Polo, this is not the only sense of dualization, but it is the chief among them. To this date, the most complete treatment of human dualities is the above-referred study of Piá (see note 28 above).

“Dualize”, though not a frequent term, is used here as the verbal form of dual or duality: adjective and noun respectively that do exist in the dictionary. “Dual” is an adjective applied to things that consist of two elements or aspects, or that are referred to them; and “duality” is the noun that expresses the quality of that which is dual.³¹ By “dualizing” we understand here “being or acting in a dual way or in duality”. This expression is of itself equivocal, for “dual” could refer to *binary sets* (mathematical consideration); to *synchronizations* of physical processes (duos); to *alternating* forms of *physical processes* (e.g. crystallization), etc. However, as the expression “dualizing being”, when applied to the human being, aims to have a philosophical connotation, we should carefully clarify what it means, namely, either the “dualization of man’s being co-existing with the being of the universe”, e.g. “to exist referring to another being (that of the universe)”; or the “dualization of man’s essence co-essentializing itself with the essence of the universe”, that is to say, to “*operate* deploying oneself in a series of differing manifestations, distributed in sets of twos with regard to the essence of the universe”. While these senses (being and operating dually) are distinct, they are not only compatible but actually *intrinsically* related, inasmuch as operations follow and manifest being.³²

Of itself, the term “dualize” can seem to indicate a separation, or a division of a single being into a duality of some sort, but what the term actually indicates, when referring to man, is an *intrinsic vinculation* (a *linking* and *linked activity*), both in the order of being and in the order of operations: i.e. a form of union. To indicate that *dualities* must not necessarily be a *rupture* of unity, we have, in the previous paragraph, used italics for the words *sets*, *synchronizations*, and *alternating* physical processes. Furthermore, *dualizations* do not break unity because each of them designates *only one* activity. This is why dualizations are very special relations that do not form sets, do not establish mere synchronizations or physical processes, for they do not establish homogenous unities nor integrate a different third thing as synthetic unions do. If it referred to the union of two homogenous

³¹ This is also the (accidental) circumstance of existing two things of the same class (cf. Moliner, 1041).

³² Thomas Aquinas, *S. Th.* I, 89, 1 c: “cum nihil operetur nisi in quantum est actu, modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius”.

elements, instead of a dualization we would have a dyad, that is to say, a union or a set of two; if it referred to two heterogeneous elements, we would then have a third thing distinct from each of them: instead of a dualization, we would speak of a mixture, a synthetic compound of two ingredients. A dualization, for its own part, is original and intrinsic: it does not require a previous state of separateness nor of pre-existing components.³³

Now that we have shown the meaning of human dualization, we will attend to the notion of *vinculation* that we have used to explain it. *Vinculation* alludes to a peculiar condition given to man both in the ontological and operative domains. Ontologically, human freedom has been created as vinculated to the being of the universe. Still, it remains free and therefore it is capable of vinculating the universe to itself. It is, then, both vinculated and vinculating. This is a kind of freedom we cannot stop being,³⁴ for it shapes us existentially as humans. In the operative plane, on the other hand, vinculation has a moral character i.e. it has the form of duty: freedom can, in its exercise, commit or not to the natural features of its essence and the essence of the universe. Whatever it does, at any rate, will have repercussions for itself: it will become good or bad, more or less free, its dominion over the world and its own body will increase or decrease,

³³ The being of the universe exists, but it does not pre-exist the dualization, as the latter is put active- and entirely by man's existence. It is in this sense that we can say that the world is not a previous component to its *dualization*. The same can be said of the essence of the universe and the human body.

³⁴ Kierkegaard (166), Heidegger (§58, 284-285: "*Selbst* seiend ist das Dasein das geworfene Seinde *als Selbst. Nicht durch* es selbst, sondern *an* es selbst *entlassen* aus dem Gründe, um *als dieser* zu sein"), and Sartre (545: "estoy condenado a ser libre") hold that we are not free of being free. This implies our liberty is a necessary feature of our being, and its relation to the world is a fact or a contingent state of affairs (Sartre, 130-131, 392): a "being thrown into the world" (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §29, 135). We reply, however, that freedom has been given to us without any negative connotation, as a "possession of the future that does not defuturize it" (cf. Polo, 1999, 230), yet still linked intrinsically and harmoniously to the being of the universe. We may then accept it, and exercise it, or not, along with the essence of the universe, in ways that are in accordance or discordance with the latter.

but it will not remain indifferent, for it can't, while it lives, cease to be vinculated to the essence of the world (even if it is vinculated freely).³⁵

The decisive point about human dualization, as a vinculated and vinculating activity, is that it is not a *composition* of two pre-existing, distinct elements, but rather an *activity that unfolds, opening towards a reference pole distinct from itself*, which it includes within the same act, even while respecting its difference.³⁶ This unfolding occurs because the deployed activity is at the very least immanent³⁷, and when it refers to the *other*, or the external, does not lose its immanence; instead, it retains it as a different pole from the external one, which it discernibly encloses in its own (immanent) unfolding. That is why it may be said that such an activity is bifurcated between two poles, one of which –the one that unfolds immanently– is actively superior to the other,³⁸ which (of itself) is merely a referent of the first one's ac-

³⁵ “Not being free of being free” implies that human freedom is a gift –i.e. it has been given to us. As, in addition to this, human freedom is necessarily linked to a freeless being, one must conclude that human freedom has been made by other being. It is in this sense that we first speak of creation and, lately, of Creator. Although this observation requires of a more detailed explanation, for the purposes of this paper making reference to the human's character of “being made” suffices for naming his maker “Creator” – as it has been usually done by reference to the Genesis: “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth (1, 1)... And God said, Let us make man in our image, like us: and let him have rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over the cattle and over all the earth and over every living thing which goes flat on the earth. And God made man in his image ...” (1, 26-27).

³⁶ The fact that it is *one single activity* with two poles is what distinguishes dualization from dualism, which understands duality as the association of two discordant activities. Cf. Polo, 1999, 168-169.

³⁷ On a transcendental level, it is an intimate activity, however on the operational level it may be immanent. Cf. Polo, 1999, 208-209, especially note 12: “Intimacy is not the same as immanency, but just a naming word for co-existence” [Intimidad no es lo mismo que inmanencia, sino una designación de la co-existencia].

³⁸ This is true only for the dualization man-universe; there are, however, other dualizations in which the active human pole is inferior to the reference pole, e.g. the dualization man-God (in which man dualizes with God, and not the other way around), which in this case is not an external but an intimate link; there are also dualizations among human transcendentals (cf. Polo, 1999, 167 ss.), which are only distinct with respect to their order, not their dignity.

tivity. This implies the poles of the dualizing action never cease being two and hierarchically different.³⁹

In light of the above, the characterizing features of the notion of dualization are, besides the obvious duality, at least three: intrinsic vinculation, active immanent unfolding, and internal hierarchy. This notes are common both to ontological and operative dualizations, though in different ways.

Obviously, if the human being is a dualizing *being*, as we have said, its dualizations cannot consequently be unique nor static,⁴⁰ nor can they be totalizing: if that were the case, he would *ipso facto* stop being a *dualizing* being, i.e. he would cease to be an activity that unfolds. A dualization means that the being of man is open to another, and that his operations stand in an unstable balance, i.e. in increasing or decreasing tension. This entails that the human being must consequently consist of several ontological dualizations and that this in turn must lead to an indefinite succession of dualized manifestations in the plane of operative dualizations, in which the activity of the predominant pole associates other inferior pole-referents to itself.⁴¹

Naturally, ontological and operative dualizations form a system: not a closed system or a totality, but an unfinished system, which allows for increase and decrease, and which is also free, i.e. perfectible without limit insofar as it is always capable of introducing novelties.

³⁹ This hierarchy can be, in some cases, ontological, and operative in others, with all the variants the latter introduces. As we have said, only in the case of transcendental dualizations is there no hierarchy, only ordered priorities.

⁴⁰ This implies they cannot be fixed beings, but rather functioning activities. That is why it is possible for one pole to be integrated into several dualizations; see the schematic summary of dualities suggested by Piá (443-444).

⁴¹ That is why dualizations can't be understood as oppositions, let alone contradictory oppositions. It is true human beings face many oppositions: between ideas, acts, and even people (social and historical oppositions); there are even oppositions inside every person, this being the only domain in which contradictions can be produced. Still, a dualization is something more radical and primary in man than any of these oppositions and contradictions –which, at any rate, result from perturbing dualizing vinculations–. For example, the “flesh-spirit” opposition as described by St. Paul (*Rom 15-23*) is just a dysfunction of the soul-body original vinculation: if a soul vinculated to the body does not appropriately associated it to itself (original sin), then the body will be disobedient to it (*cf.* St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIII, c.13, 386).

We must distinguish logical and real systems. Logical systems are sets of sentences or propositions, complete and independent, and as such, formally closed. Within logical schemes we can find modern philosophical systems insofar as they are sets of known propositions supposedly complete⁴² or total, and therefore closed.⁴³ On the other hand, real systems are (i) mechanical (homeostatic), (ii) living (open) systems capable of learning, or (iii) free systems, which are open and able to get better or worse with time.⁴⁴

The *dualizing* being, man, manifests itself through a free system of dualizations, whose integral components are not homogenous nor compounds of heterogeneous elements, but rather different unfolding activities, hierarchically organized, open and able to grow better or worse without limit. The way an active, hierarchical dualization works is *systemic* (open) rather than *systematical* (closed) (*cf.* Polo 1997, 13-14). The superior element vinculates itself to the inferior,

⁴² The least closed one is Kant's theoretical system, as he believes he has only exhausted knowledge from a formal point of view (concepts); *cf.* *KrV*, A XX; A 81-82, B107; A 148 ss., B 187 ss. Still, Kant assumes the existence of an absolute system, which would (subjectively) be reason itself (*KrVB* 765-766), and whose systematicity would only be attained by practical reason, even if just as an ideal (*KrVB* 866-867).

⁴³ Examples of strictly closed systems are SPINOZA and HEGEL. A *causa sui* is a dual identity: on the one hand, there is a cause in it, which Spinoza understands as efficient –he also calls it *natura naturans*–; on the other hand, the *sui* is understood in the order of effects, which act as a formal cause –Spinoza calls them *natura naturata* (*cf.* Falgueras Salinas, 1976, 142 ff.). As for Spinoza effects cannot exist without a cause –which they manifest and contains them–, and a cause cannot exist without effects –an effect-less cause is not a real cause–, it is evident cause and effect belong to each other in such a way that a total cause must be *causa sui*, a closed system that does not admit increase or decrease, lest it stop being *causa sui*. As to the Hegelian system, undoubtedly better known and more influent, it is similar to that of SPINOZA, but interpreted through final causality. Instead of placing it at the beginning, Hegel sets the causal power at the end, so that it directs a process of previous effects; this process is totalized (in its contents) at the same time it is suppressed (as a process), when the end comes about. HEGEL understands this process from least to most is produced by the concept, which, for him, is the power of negation. The system is understood as an evolving process of contradictions that dissolves itself in a final unicity (Absolute Spirit). (*Cf.* Hegel 1970, 3, 11-67).

⁴⁴ Though we have slightly changed some terms, we take this notions from Polo (1993a, 134ff; and 2006, 54ff).

but embracing the latter and enclosing it in its own activity, so that the result of their conjunction is plural: there is an operational elevation of the inferior element that accompanies and *modifies* the descending activity of the superior element. In a dualization, neither the superior nor the inferior poles remain intact. The superior pole is not lost in the inferior pole: it actually makes it bear fruit, so that, while keeping its superiority, it makes the inferior pole surpass its natural output without changing or going against its nature. The inferior pole's input in the superior's activity reinforces and increases the whole operation's output (with respect to the inferior pole) and endorses it in face of its proper (superior) tasks. The inferior pole's nature (referentially conditioning⁴⁵), insofar as it is respected by the superior, will make those fruits diversify, i.e. it will make it so that they cannot be only one, because then the superior's excess would not be reflected in the integral result of the dualization (which includes the inferior pole).

Let us take spoken language as an example. Thoughts are timeless, sounds are temporal; thoughts are not lost if expressed linguistically, but sounds are transformed into media for personal communication. It is true that, in order to express thoughts, we must work with the temporal "before-after" scheme, and emit sounds in an orderly fashion according to that natural cadence, but that does not make thought stray in the temporality of sounds; rather, sounds are elevated to a new condition: language. In turn, due to the scant number of

⁴⁵ When we speak of "referentially conditioning", we mean an intrinsic vinculation, but we deny it being an *ontological* limitation, as Crespo seems to suggest (2012, 27). Crespo interprets the expression "radical insufficiency" –coined by Millán Puelles– in an ontological sense, to characterize necessities (*op. cit.*, 20-21), and the expression "material being" applied to man by Alvira (1988, 159). An intrinsic vinculation establishes an obligatory referential nexus, not a negative limitation. Vinculations with the being of the universe and the body are not what makes man a finite being, but what gives the human person a distinctive character before other created spirits. If, instead of a dualizing being, man were understood as the conjunction of two complete and finished entities, then the union with the body, which is inferior, would be accidental or result in an *ontological* limitation of the person –an insuperable limitation at that–, eliminating man's transcendental freedom. On the other hand, if we understand it as a gift from the soul that dualizes with the body, neither will the union be accidental nor will the body's inferiority limit the soul: it will only give a proper method and theme to its inexhaustible activity.

sounds, thought can never be expressed with just one word: it requires sentences and sequences of sentences, according to the complexity and richness of the message we want to communicate. Sounds are not physically altered by thought, of course; but thoughts can give sounds a function that is vastly superior to their own possibilities: that of being the free and rational expression of communication between people.⁴⁶ The easiness acquired through linguistic expression will eventually enable us to put harder or more elevated things into words.

By being open and plural, operative dualizations are linked into sequences or series. In each section of these sequences, there is always an act or a superior operation that refers, active- or operatively, to an inferior one, so that none of them ends up isolated or repressed (otherwise the system would close down). Thus, each act or operation, by means of its openness, will refer, apart from the other pole on its plane, to other acts and operations above and below itself, from which it depends or which it habitates, respectively. From top to bottom this gives the impression of a cascading descent; from bottom to top, of a tiered ascent of dualizations.

However, even if operative dualizations are limitless –and thus indefinite in number, as they’re always capable of being expanded–, the poles between which the dualizing activity is deployed must be clearly defined at all times, so that for every dualization to make sense there must be some radical or endowing dualizations, in reference to which the respective poles are delimited.⁴⁷ When we say “poles” we do not

⁴⁶ We haven’t chosen spoken language as an example by chance: speech is the first practical soul-body dualization and the most readily intelligible, as it will be shown in the next part of this paper. Even if it is not –in any way– the most radical dualization, it is a model for any other personal communication in this life. Still, we must keep in mind that language is not only useful for communication; it also dualizes itself with practical actions, of which it is an important anticipation that may even serve as guidance.

⁴⁷ If we keep in mind that, except for the dualization with God and the transcendentals, dualizations are an *interior activity* that embraces an *interior* reference pole, without going out of themselves, we may understand that the series of operative dualizations do not multiply the radical poles, but rather manifest them. This is why, even being different acts, a single personal activity unfolds in them, intensifying its relation to the external radical poles: being of the universe, human

suggest anything like *initial conditions* or fixed points or static entities, but rather focal points of activity or operations. The difference between an open (and free) and a closed system is based upon the possibility to grow or diminish: while the latter can't grow or diminish, the former can, indefinitely.

According to this, we must carefully distinguish two kinds of dualizations: the radical or endowing kind, and the operative or manifesting kind. Radical dualizations establish the reference points that will delimit successive poles for the dualizations deployed after them. We can thus acknowledge that successive operational dualizations remit to radical dualizations, of which they are a manifestation. We will study the radical dualizations in the first place.

3. RADICAL OR ENDOWING HUMAN DUALIZATIONS

We say "radical" dualizations are those that have been naturally given to us by the Creator, as intrinsic ingredients of our peculiar condition as creatures. As they are (external) ends of God's creative activity,⁴⁸ they are original dualizations: new and unprecedented. We speak of them in plural because they are many and complex, but we can start by considering those we may call "nuclear" dualizations: i.e. those around which the dualizing being of man is centered. We will follow here the same order of their nuclear primacy.⁴⁹

body, essence of the universe (these we will call *nuclear*), as well as other persons and God (we will call these additional).

⁴⁸ As it is the case of man, an ontological vinculation between two creatures, one who is superior and other which is inferior, can only be made by a Being who has the faculty for creating both of them. This is the reason why the linkages "being of man-being of the universe" and "soul-body" can proceed only from God. However, these vinculations do not impose limits upon the higher creature, for the ontological ties ("co-existence" and "soul-body") are both implemented by the activity of the person, while the universe and the body provide the themes over which this activity will develop. Neither the universe nor the body diminish the superiority of that activity; to the contrary, they make it possible for that activity to associate them with its superior character, as we have explained in the note 45.

⁴⁹ With the metaphor of the "nucleus" we are not trying to refer to man's complete creature endowment, but only to that center which distinguish human beings from other personal creatures. Naturally, being a person, man surpasses that center,

a) *The ad extra nuclear dualizations*

The two dominant dualizations *immediately* gifted by God with an *ad extra* vinculating character (for human beings), and which are included in the nuclear set of dualizations, are: on one hand, the dualization “being of man - being of the universe”, a dualization which we may call *co-existence* (Polo, 1999, 31 ss.) and which is equatable with man’s act of being, for it is a dualization that is exclusive to him; and, on the other hand, the “soul-body”⁵⁰ dualization, which is equatable to the soul’s activity dualizing with the body. But when speaking of two vinculations⁵¹ we are not talking about two creatures or two distinct creations within the human being, but rather of one creation that includes two poles coordinated between themselves, one as superior (the person) and one as the inferior (soul-body).

Still, the “soul-body” dualization is very complex: for, on the one hand, while the human body does not exactly correspond to the essence of the world, it cannot develop or subsist without it, being included as one of its parts (even if directed by the soul); on the other hand, the human soul participates of the person’s freedom, so that it cannot be predetermined. Insofar as it is immediately given by God,

without ever detaching himself from it.

⁵⁰ “What is traditionally called spiritual –immortal– soul is understood here as the manifestation of the human essence, moving from the synderesis to the immaterial faculties and the psychosomatic expression [Lo que tradicionalmente se llama alma espiritual —inmortal— se entiende aquí como la manifestación esencial humana, que va desde la sindéresis hasta las potencias inmateriales y la expresión psicósomática]” (Polo, 2003, 15; 294-295). By “soul” we do not understand, then, any form of substance, but an activity through which the person reveals itself and which is developed in multiple dualizations.

⁵¹ “...the soul depends more on God than on the human person –from which it is really distinct–: it depends upon God insofar as it is created, for the human person does not create her essence. It is not even right to say that God first creates the person and from it, the soul, since he does not create through another creature, but directly” [...el alma depende de Dios más que de la persona humana —de la que se distingue realmente—; de Dios depende en tanto que creada, pues la persona no crea su esencia. Ni siquiera es correcto decir que Dios crea primero la persona y desde ella el alma, ya que no crea a partir de otra criatura, sino directamente] (Polo, 2003, 227). According to this, the human essence is created immediately by God.

this dualization is vinculating for man, but (i) this vinculation cannot develop as absolutely independent from the essence of the world, nor (ii) can it annul its freedom, for how could it then find the way for its unfolding?

Actually, the “soul-body” vinculation is a dualization that is only commenced,⁵² i.e. immediately given at the moment of creation, and must then be fulfilled by each one as a *task* assigned by the Creator.⁵³ This “body-soul” dualization can only be deployed in relation to the essence of the universe, and vice versa: the relation of a human person to the essence of the universe is not direct –as is that of human being’s co-existence and the being of the universe–, but rather mediated by means of the “soul-body” dualization. Insofar as the latter must develop in relation to the essence of the world, we can include it in a wider dualization, but only implicitly or indirectly given: the dualization “essence of man - essence of the universe”, or abbreviated, the man-world co-essentialization.⁵⁴ By virtue of this dualization,

⁵² The vinculations “being of man - being of the universe” and “soul-body” are given to us in such a way that they are coordinated between themselves. Polo thus holds that “the human person’s body is unique: any other body belongs to a different person” [el cuerpo de una persona es único: a otro cuerpo correspondería una persona distinta] (2003, 293). The form of this coordination can be acknowledged by the fact that is only given as a *commence*, so that it can be developed in duality by freedom. This means that personal disposal is pending. For a person, or spiritual living being, the coordination implies an individually given life, along with that of the soul, or added living. Corporeally, this dualization can be seen in what Polo calls “presentializing attempt”, which is not in vain, for it manages to sever itself from the physical final cause (2003, 295-298), so that it may remain available to freedom.

⁵³ *Gn* 2, 15: “The Lord God took man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it”.

⁵⁴ Polo doesn’t speak of a co-essentialization of the essence of man with the essence of the universe, nor does he develop the notion; he actually uses the term to refer to people (2003, 213-214). Still, he does speak of co-existence with the essence of the universe (2003, 265), and he even implicitly suggests a co-essentialization with it: “the duality of man with the physical universe is prevalingly practical in nature” (1999, 173); “(man) perfects the universe in duality” (1991, 46); “Evidently, in each man the person unfolds itself with the essence and the essence with nature” (1999, 165). Even if for Polo nature and the essence of the universe do not completely coincide –only nature and life–, it is obvious that the human body’s life is, *pro statu* isto, immanent to the universe. Thus, by introducing that vocable and explaining it with the

the human body is liberated from the worldly final cause by the soul, while the soul itself is morally vinculated to the *perfection* of the world, as a condition for its own perfection and that of the whole person.⁵⁵ More specifically: the body, while being something that is genetically given to each person, is not pre-configured by the worldly final cause; rather it can and must be humanely determined by the soul (*Cf.* Falgueras Salinas, 1998, 134ff.)⁵⁶, which manifests by deploying the potentialities of the body in the task of co-essentialization with the world, which is in turn modified by this activity.

Above all, then, man consists of three vinculating dualizations (*ad extra*), i.e. not chosen by himself but given by God. Two are immediate: the dualization with the being of the universe and the soul-body dualization; the latter has the consecutive *task* of dualizing with the essence of the universe (for man is called to inhabit the world⁵⁷), and

clarifications included in this subtitle, we only pretended to develop something that is already implicit in his thought.

⁵⁵ Here the looked-for first meaning of the vinculation of man vinculation of man with the essence of the universe.

⁵⁶ The body's situation is double: on the one hand it is ruled by the laws of the universe, which are only statistically necessary (i.e. final-causal); on the other hand it is directed by the soul, which emancipates the body from the final cause but not from the other co-causes. Now, as the final cause orders the other co-causes, when freed from it, man can himself order the other causes according to his own personal goals, i.e., he can turn them into means. That is why man can corporally act even against the worldly physical cause, but never without the other causes, so that when he introduces his own goals he can respect or go against the order of nature, but insofar he is not emancipated from the others, his body experiences the consequences of his actions in favor of or against it.

⁵⁷ *Gn* 1, 28; *Isa* 45, 18: "For this is what the Lord says— he who created the heavens, he is God; he who fashioned and made the earth, he founded it; he did not create it to be empty, but formed it to be inhabited". Man's inhabiting, even though located in concrete places, is always an inhabiting the universe, for his spirit knows the universe (*Cf.* Kant, *Opus Postumum*, I Convolut, Ak XXI, 31). Co-essentialization can also be called "inhabiting" the world. There are two aspects in co-essentialization: on the one hand, the inexorable vinculation of the soul with the body, and the body's with the universe; on the other hand, the liberty with which man and human life order this vinculation from the person's superiority. Just as we are free, but not free from being free (*cf.* note 34), so regarding the universe we are free, even if we are not free from being vinculated to it.

this constitutes the third and mediated nuclear dualization (co-essentialization). In this respect we might ask, why should the soul-body dualization be considered immediate and not as coming from the co-existence with the being of the universe, which is the most radical of all?

Apart from the reasons previously given, if the soul-body vinculation could immediately follow the first vinculation “being of man - being of the universe”, then it would not have to come *directly* from the Creator: it would certainly proceed from him, not in a direct way but by means of the first vinculation. In this case, there would only be one single given, immediate, *ad extra* dualization. Now, what should follow from the most radical dualization would be the “essence of man - essence of the universe” dualization, but God has not made us that way: he has made us persons gifted with a body, not with the entire world (essence of the universe). As the animal body, even being the highest and most stable substance of the universal essence, *is not the essence of the universe*, but only a part of it, the vinculation of each human person with her concrete body does not follow the “being of man - being of the universe” vinculation: it is actually an original fact, immediately set by God.

For what reason, then, has God not allowed for the person’s essence to immediately co-essentialize with the essence of the universe, but rather must do so through a previous dualization with the body? We do not know any *a priori* reasons for it to be this way, but there are *a posteriori* reasons, namely, we can know that, if it were any other case, man would not be the way he is. Indeed, a direct soul-universe dualization would either suffice only for a single human being that would exhaust the essence of the universe; or it would make every human being independent from each other, in such a way that the universe would be our only possible source for dualization. Therefore, the convenience of the body’s mediation relies on the possibility of sharing the co-essentialization with the universe with other human beings. The universe, which is not and cannot be part of a personal creature, cannot be an object of interpersonal communication; but if our vinculation with it is built by means of an animal body intrinsically linked to a person, then it may be of use for communication between men, and that is how human beings proceed from other human beings, i.e. we are a plurality of persons of *the same genus*, we

share the co-essentialization with the universe,⁵⁸ and we may even dualize among ourselves.⁵⁹

b) *The ad intra nuclear dualization*

To the three aforementioned nuclear dualizations we must add another one, also given by God, but in an *implicit* way and still inseparable from the first three, as the necessary congruence among them, namely, the “human being-essence” dualization. The wording of this statement may induce to confusion with the real distinction “being-essence”, which is shared with the universe and with every creature in general, and which *stems* from the *non-identity* that is connatural to all of them.⁶⁰ With the real distinction between essence and existence we indicate that any action that proceeds from a creature, after it has been created, cannot coincide nor equate to the being it is immediately given by God: a creature’s actions can never reach the elevation of

⁵⁸ Even though the communicative character derives from personhood, the peculiar *social* character of man, which mediates all communications, is itself derived from our bodily nature and essentially affects all our actions. Man is, by essence (soul-body) a *zoon politikón* (Aristotle, *Politics* I, 2, 1253a).

⁵⁹ The (hierarchical) dualization between merely human persons should be understood as an operative-donal dualization, not an ontological one. For example, master and disciple dualize hierarchically between themselves, not because of an ontological difference, but functionally, i.e. as long as the teacher has something to show the student. Even the father-son relation does not ontologically separate fathers from their children, for the person is directly created by God, while parents are, strictly speaking, mere natural collaborators in the formation of the body, even if they are parents of the whole child because he is one person (a divine gift).

⁶⁰ Non-identity is the distinction of all creatures with respect to God, who is the originating Identity. It is from this non-identity that creatures’ operation and being are really distinguished, because their being is given as divine gift, while their operation derives from their being and never equalizes the divine gift. Still, within creatures, personal creatures are non-identical in a special way: they are “*what they are plus what they will become*”, i.e. they are called to be more than what they are originally, and while this call does not change their original endowment, it allows them to be more in another life. This capacity influences what they are during their trial period, opening possibilities for more. Becoming more, or not, in the next life, is deserved by the development (growth or decrease) of their essence.

its being, which is a previous requirement for them.⁶¹ Not all “being-essence” distinction, however, takes the form of a dualization. This only happens with man. When we speak of a “being-essence” dualization, we obviously include what the real distinction means and implies for any creature, namely, the non-identity and the consequent distinction between being and action, but here we add its human form: insofar as he is a dualizing being, man is obviously non-identical,⁶² but in a different way to any other creature, namely, *matching his non-identity with an ontological vinculation to another being and an operative vinculation (inchoated through the soul-body vinculation) to another essence: the being and the essence of the universe, respectively*. Not only are we non-identical as creatures, we are “dualizedly” non-identical by co-existing and co-essentializing with the universe.

As we have previously stated, the dualizing activity is at least *immanent*,⁶³ and it is carried out from a superior pole referring to an

⁶¹ Making oneself is impossible, for it would require us to previously exist. However, personal creatures can try to do it *a posteriori*: in this case, their efforts would be superfluous and counter-productive. Indeed, if one already exists because one has been created, trying to create oneself again entails a waste of time and energy that should have been destined to perfecting tasks, i.e. it would entail an impoverishment of one's essence. In the end, there is a double confusion here: in the first place, identity and causality metaphysical principles (*causa sui*) are confused; lately, they are applied to man (the idea of self-realization), which generates additional confusion, for man is destined to be *more*. Being free allows growing endlessly: “To grow is much more than self-realizing oneself, because self-realization is trying to set the absolute in the end point. Growing, however, is precisely being beyond an ending point [Crecer es mucho más que autorrealizarse, porque autorrealizarse es poner el absoluto en el término. En cambio, crecer es precisamente estar más allá del término]” (Polo, 1993b, 200).

⁶² The non-identity of the universe has a principal character: its being is integrated by *two* principles (*cf.* Falgueras Salinas, 2014, 46-48). The non-identity that is common to both man and angel can be seen in that they have been made free, but they are not free of being free. The specific non-identity of man consists in that he has been made free in *co-existence* with the universe.

⁶³ Polo distinguishes mere immanence, proper of organic beings, and intimacy, which is exclusive to persons (2003, 268). In man's case, however, a dualization can be immanent and intimate at the same time, because the soul actively embraces the body through its spiritual faculties (intelligence and will); even if both are included in the

inferior one, so that the being of man realizes all dualizations *within himself*, in his own activity, even if referring to an exterior pole. When man dualizes with the being of the universe and with its essence, these dualizations do not occur in the being or the essence of the universe, but only within man himself. These dualizations must therefore correspond to a dualization that is internal to man, namely, the “being of man - essence of man” dualization, so that those we might call horizontal dualizations –with the being and the essence of the universe– correspond to a vertical dualization: “human being-essence”. Or in other words: just as being and essence in creatures are distinguished between themselves in an orderly, hierarchical fashion, so will they be hierarchically ordered in man. But if this hierarchical order is not realized *incorporating the inferior pole* (the essence) within the activity of the superior pole (being), then it may be ordered and hierarchical, but not human (dualizing). Thus, while man dualizes *doubly* with another (the being and the essence of the universe), his being dualizes with respect to his own essence (soul-body). Let us be clear: the vinculations of man with the being and the essence of the universe are not simply parallel to the being and the essence of man: they are also dualized between themselves (within man) in virtue of man’s dualizing character. This means the co-existence of man with the universe dualizes –through the “soul-body” vinculation– with his worldly co-essentialization, in such a way that the latter manifests *according* to man’s co-existing, but also indirectly having an effect upon him.⁶⁴

body (*ibidem*, 15; 87), the intellectual faculty is immanent (2003, 134; 253 note 15), while the will is not.

⁶⁴ Unlike the worldly being-essence distinction, the essence of man has an effect on him because it dualizes with its being. The highest active pole (being) has been gifted to us by creation, and therefore is immutable by human action. Still, because man is called to be more (intensely, highly) than what he is by endowment, this active pole must have a *capacity* to be (more), that is affected (increased or decreased) by the result of his action. Thus the manifestation of the dualizing activity, which comes about in the essence, has an immanent effect on the active pole, not by altering or annulling the endowed being, but accruing or shrinking its *capacity* to be more fully in another life. Insofar as we are still not what we will become in the end (*1 Jn* 3, 2), to answer God’s call our being (freedom) requires our actions, which indirectly have an effect on it, for what we become will be given to us as a reward or a punishment by God, according to what they deserve. It is only in this sense that we can say human

Naturally, this last radical dualization, by coming through man's created nature, i.e. from his characteristic non-identity (as a dualizing being) which God has granted it, should not be considered as something given apart from the previous dualizations; rather, it is *implicit* in them and it *derives* from man's natural condition as a (human) creature. Therefore, besides the vinculating dualizations given by the Creator, there is another nuclear dualization, though connatural or *derived* from the created nature of man: that of the *human* being and essence, which reunites within, and vertically, the double horizontal vinculation, immediate with being, mediated with the essence of the universe. There is no point by point correspondence between man's non-identity and the non-identity of the universe, but rather a dualization deployed exclusively by man's non-identity, which dualizes internally and externally. The double vinculation of man regarding an *external* pole (being-essence of the universe) is thus connected in a complex way with an *internal dualization* of the human active pole (being-essence of man), whose inferior pole (essence) dualizes in turn, internally, with a part of the universe (the body) and externally with the universe itself.

However, this fourth and last nuclear dualization (human being-essence), being nothing more than the congruence between the other three (the two immediate and the mediated dualizations), is not simply added to them. As we have pointed out, this fourth dualization is the mode in which all possible dualizations occur, namely, at least as an immanent activity that unfolds *ad intra* between two hierarchically integrated poles. The other *ad extra* dualizations would not be possible if man was not also, *at the same time*, a dualizing being in his internal activity, for a dualization is, to repeat, at least an immanent activity. Of course, these considerations do not intend to suggest a temporal lapse of any sort between the fourth and the other vinculating dualizations, but rather the harmonious adjustment of a crea-

beings modify their being: insofar as the essential manifestation will condition what we will become by divine sanction. In this life, the co-being is manifested through the co-essentialization, but it is also vinculated to it, for co-essential operations strengthen or weaken human being's capacity in light of what he will become. To sum up: even during this life it is not man's being but his capacity for what he will become, what is affected by his essential actions. This is not the case for the essence and being of the universe.

ture, man, by God's creative action, which, as we have seen, even while having two distinct vinculating ends does not give place to two creatures, but only to one: the human being. That is precisely why we have called these four dualizations "nuclear", as they shape the given nucleus that characterizes man: (i) immediate, (ii) mediated *ad extra*, and (iii) derived *ad intra*.

As they correspond between themselves in a complex but harmonious way, the poles of the *ad extra* dualizations –namely, "being of man - being of the universe" and "essence of man - essence of the universe"– with those of the *ad intra* dualization –human being-essence–, we may deduce there are no more nuclear dualizations other than those mentioned.⁶⁵

c) *Additional radical dualizations*

Before we finish this first part of the paper, we must necessarily note that, while nuclear-radical vinculations have an effect on (the being of) man and his actions, they are not all the human dualizations. What they imply is only that any other dualization must be affected by them and therefore has to be associated to them.

Because of his character as "additionally", (*cf.* Polo, 1999, *passim*)⁶⁶ or as a person, man must communicate with other human

⁶⁵ Initially this harmony is not manifest, for –as will be seen in a diagram reproduced at the end–, the *ad intra* derived dualization seems to have only two poles (human being-essence), while the vinculating *ad extra* dualizations are three (co-existence, soul-body, co-essentialization). However, as the human essence is itemized in two internal poles (soul-body), the second of which forms a part of the universe, there is an implicit third pole, this time external: the universe or essence of the universe. As we have said above, the co-existence with the being of the universe has been given to us as an initial (finished) endowment, while the co-essentialization with the essence of the universe has been given to us only in an inchoated way, in order to leave a margin for freedom of action and interpersonal communication, which are exercised from the soul and through the body. Only insofar as we exercise freedom of action and communication do we operationally integrate the two "soul-body" and "essence of man - essence of the universe" dualizations, for at the time we develop our rule over the universe the person's manifestation grows. There is thus harmony, but not in a symmetrical and completed manner, but rather operationally or in deployment.

⁶⁶ To be able to co-exist with the universe, the human person must be "additionally"

beings and look to communicate with God. Such a requirement, which has an ontological foundation, is common to all persons, including non-human persons, so that there are other ways of communication for other personal beings, even if the nuclear vinculations we have just described imply that the human way of doing this through dualizations. We call “additional” those interpersonal relations that intrinsically follow from personhood and have not a dualizing character *per se*, but rather acquire it in man because they indirectly receive it through the nuclear dualizations. It is only in reference to the latter, and insofar as they are surpassed, that the former can be considered “additional” dualizations.⁶⁷

The root of dualizations is the human person.⁶⁸ Being a person is more radical than being dualizing, for one cannot dualize unless one is able to communicate: to give and give oneself. However, as we have said, not all persons dualize: only human persons. *The dualization is what gives man his own ontological profile.* This character comes directly from the will of the Creator, who has wanted to vinculate us in an ontological and operative way with the being and the essence of the universe, respectively. The key of our entire proposal rests, precisely, on the consideration that the ontological vinculations of the human person to the being of the universe and to the body –made by the Creator– have configured man as a dualizing personal being,⁶⁹ or,

from the universe. This surplus explains why the relation with the universe does not impede us from being persons that as such must communicate with God and other personal creatures.

⁶⁷ By calling them “additional” in contrast with the nuclear dualizations we must understand them as if they were added: the relation to God and other persons is intrinsically ontological to all created persons. As usual, language falls short of our purpose. Such dualizations allow the person to have activities that do not only relate to the world and the body.

⁶⁸ “If there were only one person, and there was nothing else, strictly speaking the person would remain unknown and the dualities would disappear. This is not properly speaking a disgrace but rather an impossibility, for nothing human is real without personal co-existence [Si no existiese más que una persona, y todo lo demás no lo fuera, en rigor la persona quedaría inédita y las dualidades desaparecerían. Pero no se trata propiamente de una desgracia, sino de una imposibilidad, porque nada humano es real sin la coexistencia personal]” (Polo, 1999, 166).

⁶⁹ Someone might object to this thesis by claiming that, in order to be a dualizing being, as seems apparent, you must only have two poles, and we have found three in

in other words, that the immediate *ad extra* vinculations give the human person its distinctive character.

If we keep in mind that *pro statu isto*⁷⁰ what remains for the exercise of our freedom is the co-essentialization with the universe through the soul-body dualization –what vinculates us, even if it admits a gifted growth, does not directly depend on our will–, we will understand that the development and detailed expansion of our suggested anthropological scheme must run through man’s essence. Indeed, the merely inchoative dotation –not predetermined according to a final causality– of the second pole of the human essence (the body) demands that we concern ourselves with it, and this task must be done through our operations. Naturally, this undertaking must be exercised interacting with the *essence of the universe* from the soul, but with the concourse of the body, because the “human being-essence” dualization is hierarchical but not unilateral. Even if it is not hierarchically the highest among the nuclear dualizations, the “essence of man - essence of the universe” dualization makes it clear that, besides the ontological necessity that vinculates us with the being of the universe in order for us to be men,⁷¹ there is another non-

man (co-being, body-soul, co-essentialization). We should note however these are not three poles but three dualizations, each integrated by two poles. There is an innumerable amount of dualizations, but in each case there are only two poles, even though each pole (X) can be integrated by one or more dualizations, with the sole condition that the two members of the subordinated dualization function in accordance with respect to the other pole (X'). See e.g. synderesis, whose inferior poles are the intellect and the will (Polo, 2003, 295, notes 51, y 296). We must not forget that these poles are not static entities, but functioning acts.

⁷⁰ This is a classic expression: *cf.* for example Duns Scotus, *Questiones Quodlibetales*, q. 15, art. 1 (1968, 541); or Thomas Aquinas, who refers to this same state with the expression «*in via*»: *cf. Summa Theologiae* I, 12, 2 ad 2; 56, 3 c. With this expression we mean the current state of man is a trial period, in which the sin of our first fathers has intervened *a posteriori*. Besides, it is one thing to be the direct end of divine creation (personal creatures) and another the situation of trial in which, because we are free, the created person is placed. God placed man in paradise to keep and cultivate *while he was on trial* (*Gn 2, 15-17*), not eternally. In eternal life we will not have to work. Thus we must not confuse our trial situation with our condition as personal creatures: the first is transitory; the other, permanent.

⁷¹ Death affects the human essence (in the body) and its dualizations; not the existence i.e. the co-being, nor the dualizations that are above co-existence: only the

ontological necessity, but rather moral in character, that vinculates us to the essence of the universe so that, collaborating with other human beings, we may perfect it and thus be able to “be *more*”, i.e. to give ourselves a proper destination.⁷² Operative dualizations are necessary in the second sense. We will study them in the next part of this investigation.

To sum up, and so the reader may have a clear idea of the notional distribution corresponding to the terminology we’ve used, we offer the following diagram:⁷³:




Diagram: radical or given dualizations⁷⁴

soul-body dualization and the co-essentialization with the essence of the universe. However, while this life lasts, man cannot dissociate himself from this co-essentialization: he cannot develop any action that has no bodily accompaniment, nor some sort of repercussion in the essence of the universe.

⁷² The ultimate sense of human action relies on perfecting the world, and oneself.

⁷³ We have included some indicators in the diagram that suggest alternate denominations (\leftrightarrow) and others ($---\rightarrow$) that point to a correspondence between the poles of the *ad extra* and *ad intra* dualizations.

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⁷⁴ It should be understood that we are speaking of radical dualizations of the *human person*. The order of this diagram corresponds to the exposition, which describes man's situation as a *viator*, not with their real hierarchical order, for even if all of them integrate man's idiosyncrasy, additional dualizations are higher than the nuclear ones. In turn, the shape of our diagram does not suggest that the distinctions established in it remain isolated between themselves; rather, it sums up an *open* system in which everything is related to everything else. The reader will see, for example, that man's being and essence appear dissociated in one instance and linked in another; this is not a repetition, but a way of (schematically) indicating the congruence (union) between *ad extra* dualizations (being of man -being of the universe; essence of man-essence of the universe) and *ad intra* dualizations (man's being-essence).

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